Cuba’s Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States
By Enrique Carrasco
On December 16, 2001, two ships arrived in Havana loaded with chicken and corn, marking the first direct sale of U.S. products to Cuba since the imposition of the trade embargo over forty years ago. The shipment was made possible by the most important piece of legislation since the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, otherwise known—many countries might say infamously known—as the Helms-Burton Act. I am referring to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA), signed into law by President Clinton in October 2000, which for the first time allowed U.S. companies to sell agricultural products, medical supplies, and processed foods on a cash basis directly to Cuba.
Both Cuba and the U.S. agricultural sector have eagerly taken advantage of this opening. On the one hand, Cuba imports $4 billion of goods annually from countries other than the United States, of which twenty-five percent are agricultural products. And it is keen on purchasing from the United States because transportation costs from other countries run approximately thirty to thirty-five percent of production costs, thereby elevating the costs of non-U.S.imports. On the other hand, the agricultural sectors in many economically depressed states in the United States are in a constant search for export opportunities. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that, according to Pedro Alvarez, President of Alimport, Cuba’s government-operated import company, Cuba has purchased $463 million in U.S. farm goods since 2001. Wheat, corn, soy, and poultry have dominated the export market to Cuba, but exports have also included rice, coffee creamer, beer, tobacco, cheese, livestock, pet food, field peas, barley, chickpeas, lentils, paper, lumber, seafood, and fruit. A good portion of these exports come from U.S. Midwestern states, including Iowa. Indeed, since 2001, Iowa has exported approximately $30 million worth of food and agricultural products to Cuba, with sales in corn, soybeans, wheat, ice cream, dried distiller’s grain, and pork. Looking at corn alone, Iowa companies have sold at least 2.2 million bushels of that commodity to Cuba since October 2002, worth $5.1 million. Given these numbers, it is no wonder that Cuba was Iowa’s sixteenth largest export market in the market year 2002/2003. 
In light of the trading ties between the United States and Cuba that have developed as a result of the Trade Sanctions & Reform Act and, if sanctions are loosened further, the potential for U.S. foreign investment in Cuba’s tourism sector, transportation system, power generation and transmission, and communication infrastructure, it is time to assess Cuba’s state of development as it relates to the interests of U.S. Midwestern states.
Development, of course, is a broad term. It has an economic component, typically relating to a country’s macroeconomic conditions. In this regard, Cuba’s state of development is a precarious one, evidenced by the following statistics:
- Cuba’s external debt is estimated at $12.2 billion, with another $20 billion owed to Russia. It has been reported that Cuba began defaulting on short- and medium-term credits in late 2001. This prompted Moody’s to lower Cuba’s credit rating to "speculative, very poor" (Caa1) in late 2002.
- Cuba’s GDP grew 2.6% in 2003 “despite a severe foreign exchange shortage and a 40% decline in sugar production”  that prompted it to close 70 of its 156 sugar mills. The GDP growth, due in part to increased tourism, is an improvement over the meager 1.1% growth in 2002, but less than the 3% in 2001 and the more than 6% growth in the 1999/2000 period.
- In 2003, Cuba’s budget deficit grew to 3.5% of GDP as compared to "less than 3% in 2001."
- The UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean has reported that Cuba’s 2002 “balance of payments deficit was $513 million,” with a “current account deficit [of] $293 million.” Both figures have increased somewhat in 2003.
- Foreign investment has dropped significantly over the past few years. The Cuban government reported that the number of joint ventures declined in 2003, from 403 to 363.
- In 2003, exports rose 14.1% from $1.4 billion in 2002 and imports climbed 13.4% from $4.1 billion. Tourism revenues increased 16% in 2003 "from $1.76 billion in 2002."
- Unemployment stands at 12% and as many as “30% of workers are displaced or unemployed.”
- Real wages have dropped nearly 50% since 1989, just before Cuba's acute economic crisis that ushered in the Special Period. The average salary is $10 per month.
But economic factors are not the sole basis for measuring development. Social and human development is also important for measuring a society’s well-being and the extent to which the individual is empowered through expanded choices to improve his or her quality of life. So in addition to economic measurements such as per capita income, social and human development asks a number of fundamental questions. Does an individual lead a long and healthy life? How well educated is the individual? Does the individual have a decent standard of living? It also considers the legal, social, and cultural environment in which the person lives as well as gender equity, civil and political freedoms, and human rights.
How have the people of Cuba fared in terms of social and human development? In this regard, it appears that we have two Cubas. One Cuba has a rich cultural heritage that has produced great musicians, such as the pianist Ernesto Lecuona, great writers, such as the novelist Alejo Carpentier, and great artists, such as Wilfredo Lam. A Cuba that has been committed to principles of equality and non-discrimination, as evidenced by its ratification of the conventions calling for elimination of all forms of discrimination based on race and gender. A Cuba whose constitution not only prohibits discrimination but guarantees, among other things, equal pay and equal access to education, health, housing, and employment opportunities. A Cuba whose people participate in a communitarian society that stresses legality. A Cuba whose populace enjoys literacy (94%), life expectancy (75.4 years), and infant mortality rates comparable to many industrialized countries, with more doctors per capita than any other country in the world. And consequently a Cuba that, according to the United Nations Development Programme, has achieved a state of “high human development.”
Then there is the other Cuba, the totalitarian state. A Cuba that uses law as a repressive tool. A Cuba that has been censured by the UN Commission on Human Rights for its “continued violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . ., such as freedom of expression, association, and assembly” as well as the “continued repression of members of the political opposition and . . . detention of dissidents.” A Cuba that in April of last year, after one-day trials meted out harsh prison sentences, some as long as twenty years, to seventy-five Cuban citizens who were said to have been promoting civil, political, and human rights, hosting independent libraries, and practicing independent journalism. A Cuba where racial and gender inequalities continue to exist. A Cuba that is more coercive than communitarian. A Cuba of economic privilege for a few and deprivation for many.
It is this Cuba that merits a continuation of U.S. sanctions, according to one segment of U.S. society. As Iowa’s Senator Charles Grassley has observed, lifting the sanctions now would only reward Fidel Castro for his actions. The current administration’s policy is quite clear. It has no intention of easing the embargo, as illustrated by President Bush’s recent declaration to re-enforce the travel ban to Cuba, and the formation of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, whose express purpose is, among other things, to starve the Cuban government of revenue and to topple Fidel Castro as soon as possible.
However, another segment of our society, including human rights advocates such as Human Rights Watch, believes the U.S. sanctions have failed to promote democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba and have instead increased the misery of a great many Cubans. Citing Canada and the European Union, they argue that an approach of constructive economic engagement will ultimately lead to change for the better in Cuba. This approach has bipartisan support in Congress, as evidenced by the formation of pro-engagement, bipartisan Cuba Working Groups in both the House and Senate. In the state of Iowa, Senator Harkin and four of the five Representatives favor engagement.
The latest manifestation of the confrontation between pro-embargo and engagement constituencies occurred in Congress last year. Facing the threat of veto from the White House, in October eighteen Republican senators, largely from Midwestern states, joined forty-nine Democrats to pass an amendment to the 2004 Transportation-Treasury Appropriations Bill, identical to an amendment that passed in the House previously by a bipartisan vote of 227 to 188, that would have lifted the restrictions on travel to Cuba. However, to the dismay of engagement constituencies, the amendment was controversially stripped out of the legislation even before the conference committee formally met.
One might ask, what do travel restrictions have to do with trade between Cuba and U.S. Midwestern states? According to one study, lifting the travel restrictions would produce between $126 million and $252 million in annual U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba above the current sales, creating between 3490 and 6980 jobs for Americans. And if the embargo were lifted completely, some say sales of U.S. agricultural goods could exceed a billion dollars annually and annual related economic output would exceed $3.6 billion. Much of this output would come from U.S. Midwestern states, particularly Iowa (more than $70 million), Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, andMissouri. Over 30,000 jobs would be created, with a good portion of the job creation occurring here in Iowa (nearly 2000). Lifting the embargo would not only boost trade, but, as I have mentioned, it would also allow U.S. foreign investment in Cuba.
Although there are principled bases for arguing for or against U.S. sanctions against Cuba, for political junkies it all boils down to politics. The pundits predicted a close Presidential race in 2004, with the swing states being decisive in deciding who would win. Florida, with its twenty-nine electoral votes, is a key swing state that can determine who will be president. As all of you can recall, in 2000, George Bush beat Al Gore in Florida by 537 votes. Cuban-Americans constitute approximately eight percent of Florida’selectorate. Eighty percent of Cuban-Americans voted for Bush. If you do the math, arguably the pro-embargo Cuban-Americans delivered the presidency to Bush. With respect to the 2004 elections, political observers noted that there is a growing number of non-Cuban Latinos in Florida—Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans, who traditionally have voted Democratic. This trend made Cuban-Americans, who are troubled over the administration’s continuation of the “wet foot, dry foot policy,” even more critical to President Bush’s re-election. And John Kerry could not afford to ignore this key constituency either.
George Bush is now the United States President and he has progressively taken a harder line against Cuba. Just recently he declared that US exporters would no longer be able to use a globally common form of export transaction with Cuba because it violates TSRA’s cash-in-advance payment rule. This has outraged U.S. politicians and exporters. It seems that President Bush is hell-bent on ousting Fidel Castro, even at the expense of the Cuban people, who bear the brunt of the embargo and Bush’s policies, and those in the United States who wish to engage in commerce with Cuba while at the same time urging that country to pursue political and economic reform.
 Fred Gaboury, U.S. Grain Arrives in Cuba (Dec. 12, 2001), available at http://www.cpusa.org/ article/articleprint/328 (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). The shipment was organized by Archer Daniels Midland (ADM).
 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021 to 6091(2004). On Cuban sanctions, see generally MICHAEL P. MALLOY, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 459-510 (2001); MATIAS F. TRAVIESO-DIAZ, THE LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE MARKET CUBA 13-23 (1997); J. Brett Busby, Note, Jurisdiction to Limit Third-Country Interaction with Sanctioned States: The Iran and Lybia Sanctions and Helms-Burton Acts, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 621 (1998); Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 575 (1997);Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of United States Sanctions Laws with Obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1259 (1998); Stephen A. Lisio, Helms-Burton and the Point of Diminishing Returns, 72 INT’L AFFAIRS 691 (1996); Richard D. Porotsky, Note, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 901 (1995); Christine L. Quickenden, Note, Helms-Burton and Canadian-American Relations at the Crossroads: The Need for an Effective, Bilateral Cuban Policy, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 733 (1997); Antonella Troia, Note, The Helms-Burton Controversy: An Examination of Arguments That The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 Violates U.S. Obligations Under Nafta, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 603 (1997).
 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, H.R. 4461, 106th Cong. §§903(b), 908(b) (2000) [hereinafter TSRA]. TSRA forbids U.S. public or private financing of sales to Cuba. Attempts have been made to amend the legislation to allow private U.S. institutions to finance sales. See News Release, Enzi Promotes Cuban Trade for U.S. Farmers, May 17, 2002, available at http://enzi.senate.gov/cubtra.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (describing an amendment co-sponsored by Senators Enzi and Dorgan along with a bipartisan group of five other senators to allow private U.S. institutions to finance food sales to Cuba). See also Sean D. Murphy, Reform of U.S. Sanctions Relating to Agriculture and Medicine, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 414 (2001). Despite the imposition of the embargo in 1961, subsidiaries of U.S. companies in third world countries had been able to import food and medicine to Cuba from 1975 until the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992. See Clara David, Trading with Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act and Export Rules, 8 FLA. J. INT’L L. 385, 386-87 (1993); Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455, 460-61 (2004). In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act codified the executive orders that until then had implemented the embargo, thereby enacting into law the prohibition of trade between U.S. agricultural and pharmaceutical companies and Cuba. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 419, 422 (1996).
 See Stephen J. Powell, The Export of Medical Supplies and Agricultural Products in Cuba, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 81 (2002); Michael W. Gordon, The Potential for Future Economic Relations with Cuba, 15 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 107 (2002).
 JOHN SKORGBURG, AM. FARM BUREAU FED. ECON. ANALYSIS TEAM, TRADE WITH CUBA: THE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC IMPACT FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE, available at http://www.ifbf.org/commodity/New%20Folder/ 20020115_cubabriefing2_notesontradewithcuba.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 JOHN SKORGBURG, AM. FARM BUREAU FED., CUBAN UPDATE ON PURCHASE OF CUBAN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES: SEVEN MONTH SALES = $80.7 MILLION US MORE TO COME!, http://www.fb.com/issues/analysis/Cuba_Briefing_Issue10.html (last visited Oct 6, 2004).
 See Farm Leaders Call for End to Embargo, PRESS CITIZEN (Iowa City), Dec. 18, 2003, at 1C; see generally Alexander Williams III, Note, More Assistance Please: Lifting the Cuban Embargo May Help Revive American Farms, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 455 (2002).
 Anita Snow, U.S. Farmers Promote Wares in Cuba, HAVANA J., Nov. 2, 2003, available at http://havanajournal.com/business_comments/977_0_4_0_C (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). See also Jason Straziuso, State looks to Export Goods to Cuba, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 16, 2004, available at http://www.centredaily.com/mld/dailytimes/2004/04/17/ business/8446498.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (interviewing John Kavulich, President of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, who estimates agricultural exports to Cuba since 2001 to total $460 million).
 See U.S.-CUBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL, INC., SUMMARY OF TSRA-AUTHORIZED EXPORTS TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA SINCE NOVEMBER 2001 (2002). See also JOHN SKORBURG, AM. FARM BUREAU FED., CUBAN UPDATE ON PURCHASES OF US AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES: ANNUAL 2002 SALES = $138.4 MILLION US (2003), http://www.fb.com/issues/analysis/Cuba_Briefing_Issue13 .pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (noting that wheat, corn, soy, and poultry were the “big winners in2002” in terms of agricultural sales); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., STATE EXPORTS BY COMMODITY (2002) , http://www.fas.usda.gov (last visited Oct. 6, 2004)(calculating U.S. state exports by commodity to Cuba including wheat, soy, poultry, rice, tobacco,livestock, and fruit); U.S.-CUBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL, INC. (2002), http://www.cubaexhibitions.com/alimport.PDF (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (listing the commodities imported by Alimport from the United States including coffee creamer, beer, cheese, pet food, field peas, barley, chickpeas, lentils, paper, lumber, and seafood, among others)
 See Anita Snow, 8 Million Ag Deal with Cuba; Iowa Backs More, http://www.iowafarmer.com/03/31/news/cubasales.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 See IOWA CORN GROWERS ASS’N, INCREASING EXPORTS OF IOWA CORN, http://www.iowacorn.org/farmers/farmers_9c.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (discussing how “Iowa companies have sold approximately 450,000 metric tons of corn” since limited trade with Cuba resumed in 2001).
 Cuba Briefing Notes: Investment Overview, at 16-17, http://www.ace.uiuc.edu/faculty/ goldsmith/cuba/investment.PDF (last visited Oct. 6, 2004)
 For literature relating to Cuba’s economy, see generally La Economía Cubana: Reformas estructurales y desempeño en los noventas (Mexico City: CEPAL, Fondo de Cultura Económica (2000)); LA ECONOMÍA CUBANA: REFORMAS ESTRUCTURALES Y DESEMPEÑO EN LOS NOVENTA, COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (NACIONES UNIDAS, 2000); CARMELO MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES: COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE, CUBA, AND COSTA RICA: CHILE (2000); CARMELO MESA-LAGO, CTR. FOR A FREE CUBA, THE CUBAN ECONOMY AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AND DEBATE ON THE FUTURE, SPECIAL REPORT, WASHINGTON D.C. (July 2002); Charles Trumbull, Economic Reforms and Social Contradictions in Cuba, in 10 CUBA IN TRANSITION 305 (2000), available at http:// lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba10/asce10.pdf (last visited Oct 6, 2004); INVESTIGACIÓN SOBRE DESAROLLO HUMANO Y EQUIDAD EN CUBA 1999, PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESAROLLO (PNUD) (2000).
 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, CUBA’S FOREIGN DEBT (July 24, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/22743pf.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 Cuba GDP Grows 2.6 Pct in 2003 Despite Cash Crunch, LATINPETROLEUM.COM, Dec. 23, 2003, available at http://www.latinpetroleum.com/2718.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Cuba GDP]; Gary Marx, Cuba Restructures Sugar Industry, Making 100,000 Jobless, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2002, available at http://www.realcities.com/mld/philly/news/world/3999517.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 Nancy San Martin, Castro Shuffles Posts As Cuban Economy Sags, MIAMI HERALD, July 14, 2003, available at http://www.havanajournal.com/business_comments/A650_0_4_0_M (lastvisited Nov. 9, 2004).
 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, CUBA: ECONOMIC SUMMARY (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/22902.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ledaw/text/econvention.htm (last visted Oct. 6, 2004) (the CEDAW has been ratified by 174 countries including Cuba). See also Robert Perkovich & Reena Saini, Women’s Rights in Cuba: “Mas o Menos,” 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 399 (2002) (discussing the level of gender equality in Cuba); Carollee Bengelsdorf, On the problem of studying women in Cuba, RACE AND CLASS, Autumn 1985, at 35 (providing an overview of the historical development of women’s rights in Cuba). But see Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba’s Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 15 (1994) (concluding that while women have been afforded more opportunities in the workplace they are still subjected totraditional role expectations).
 INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., ORG. OF AM. STATES, ANNUAL REPORT 1994, HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 (February 17, 1995), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/94eng/chap.4a.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). See also Marjorie Cohn, Affirmative Action and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties: United States’ Violation of its International Obligations, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 249, 256 n.38 (2002) (pointing out that “Cuba has the highest literacy rate in the Americas and one of the highest in the world, the longest life expectancy in Latin America and one of the longest in the world, more doctors per capita than any other country in the world, and a lower infant mortality rate than the United States”).
 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003: MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END HUMAN POVERTY 238 (2003), available at http://www.hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/pdf/hdr03_complete.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). A country’s state of human development is measured, in part, by the human development index (HDI), which is comprised of a life expectancy index, an education index, and a GDP index. It is intended to measure three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Id. at 340, 341.
 Rts., Res. 22-20-10, UN Comm. of Hum. April 18, 2001. The resolution was drafted and introduced by the Czech Republic and co-sponsored by over 15 other countries including the United States. It was adopted by a roll-call vote of 22 in favor, 20 opposed with 10 abstentions.For publications dealing with Cuba and human rights, see generally SARAH A. DECROSSE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CUBA’S REPRESSIVE MACHINERY: HUMAN RIGHTS FORTY YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/cuba (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); LA DECLARACIÓN UNIVERSAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CUBA (Editora Política, 1991); Damian J. Fernandez, Democracy and Human Rights: The Case of Cuba, in DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CARIBBEAN 97-112 (Ivelaw L. Griffith & Betty N. Sedoc-Dahlberg eds., 1997); JUAN CLARK ET AL., RESEARCH INST. FOR CUBAN STUDIES, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA: AN EXPERIENTIAL PERSPECTIVE, (1991); Natasha Parassram Concepción, Prison Conditions in Cuba: An Assessment of Cuba’s Compliance with Basic Human Rights Standards, 7 HUM. RTS. BR. 15 (2000); Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Sixth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 213 (2001); David W. Johnston, Cuba’s Quarantine of AIDS Victims: A Violation of Human Rights?, 15 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 189 (1992); Hernandez Truyol, supra note 25; BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CUBA, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/global/human rights/2000_hrp_report/cuba.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2004);I-ACHR, 2 ANNUAL REPORTS 2000, HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, Doc. 20 (rev. Apr. 16, 2001).
 Press Release, Organization of American States, Cuba: Inter-American Commission Expresses Profound Concern Over the Arrest and Prosecution of Political Dissidents (Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.iachr.org/Comunicados/English/2003/10.03.htm (last visited Oct. 6,2004). Press Release, Organization of American States, Cuba: Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Condemns the Execution of Three Persons (Apr. 16, 2003), available at http://www.iachr.org/Comunicados/English/2003/12.03.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003). But cf. Philip Agee, Former CIA Agent Tells: How U.S. Infiltrates “Civil society” to Overthrow Governments, GRANMA INT’L, Aug. 5, 2003 (suggesting that the dissidents arrested in Cuba were not in fact “dissidents” nor “prisoners of conscience,” but rather instruments of the U.S. government employed towards effecting revolutionary change); Cuban Writers Respond to Media Maneuver, CUBAN LIBR. SOLID. GROUP, Jan. 22, 2004 (describing these so-called “dissidents” as“individuals recruited and paid by the United States government”); John Pateman, Background Information Pertaining to Recent Events in Cuba – Part 2, CUBAN LIBR. SOLID. GROUP, July 19, 2003 (questioning the status of the individuals arrested in April of 2003 and suggesting that the individuals were traitors paid by the U.S. government).
 Hernandez Truyol, supra note 25; PEDRO PEREZ SARDUY ET AL., AFRO-CUBAN VOICES: ON RACE AND IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY CUBA (2000); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws: A United States-Latin America Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1128-44 (2002).
 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CUBA’S REPRESSIVE MACHINERY: HUMAN RIGHTS FORTY YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION (1999) (arguing that the Cuban legal system, through both the letter of its laws and the manner in which those laws are enforced, systematically represses thecivil and political rights of the Cuban people including the right to expression, association, andassembly).
 RICARDO L. TEJADA, LATIN AM. NETWORK INFO. CTR., COMMENTS ON “LABOR EFFECTS OF ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN CUBA” BY ENRIQUE S. PULMAR, available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/ la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba6/19Tejada2.fm.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 John Suarez, Should the World Maintain Sanctions Against the Castro Regime?, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/cuba/cuba15.htm (last visited May 5, 2004) (describing the position of many Cuban exiles that the Cuban sanctions should not be lifted).
 Steve Brown, Senate Panel at Loggerheads Over Cuba Trade, CNSNEWS.COM, Sept. 5, 2003, at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page=\Nation\archive\200309\NAT20030905a.html (last visited Oct.6, 2004).
 See PHILIP PETERS, LEXINGTON INST., THE BUSH CUBA POLICY AFTER TWO YEARS (2003), available at http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/cuba/030520newsletter.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). For the positions on Cuba taken by the Democratic presidential candidates, see LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP, DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ON CUBA, available at http://www.lawg.org/pages/new%20pages/Misc/prez-candidates1A.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). See also Jane Franklin, The Cuba Obssession, THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1993, available at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/JBFranklins/canf.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004)(tallying up the organizations in favor of the embargo, including the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), and those that oppose it); CANF AND THE FREE CUBA PAC, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/cubareport/free.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (describing CANF“as the center of virtually all pro-embargo Cuban-American political activity”).
 See Bush Won’t Ease Cuba Trade, Travel Ban, CNN.COM, May 20, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/20/cuba.bush/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); Brown, supra note 35.
 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COMMISSION FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (stating, as one of the group’s missions, to “[b]ring about a peaceful, near-term end to the dictatorship”). In May 2004, the Commission issued its report. The first of six chapters outlines a strategy to bring Castro’s governance to an end and to undermine the government’s “succession” strategy. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, CUBA UPDATE (June 16, 2004), at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20040616.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY]. In June 2004, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued new regulations implementing travel-related and remittance recommended by the report. See id.
 Press Release, Washington Office on Latin America, Pro-Engagement Groups Applaud Senators’ “Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act” (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.wola.org/cuba/ press_release_freedom_travel_act_april30_03.htm (last visited Oct. 6,2004); Cuba: Human Rights and US Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch).
 For the twelfth consecutive year, the United Nations General Assembly voted in November 2003 to condemn the embargo. Evelyn Leopold, Record UN Vote Against US Embargo on Cuba, REUTERS, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ security/sanction/cuba/unvote/1104embargo.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). See Andrew J. Rosell, Comment, The Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations, A Policy Shift from the Helms-Burton Act, 7 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 235 (2001).
 The EU-Cuba relationship has been defined by the so-called Common Position, adopted in 1996, which calls for trade and development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in order to encourage democratization and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. See Common Position of 2 December 1996 Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba, 1996 O.J. (L.322), available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/extrel/cuba/cuba3.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). After the crackdown on dissidents in Cuba in the spring of 2003, the EU announced it would review its Common Position with Cuba. It also limited high-level government visits, reduced member states’ participation in cultural events in Cuba, and increased official contacts with dissident groups in Cuba. Moreover, the EU decided to reject Cuba’s efforts to join the Contonou Agreement, an agreement of trade and aid between seventy-seven African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, and the EU. However, the Common Position has not been abandoned, despite the deterioration of relations between the EU and Cuba. See PETER CLEGG, EUROPEAN RIM POLICY AND INV. COUNCIL, EU-CUBAN RELATIONS: AN END TO ‘CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT?,’ available at http://www.erpic.org/perihelion/articles2003/october/cuba.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). Similarly, Canada is in agreement with both the U.S. and EU positions towards supporting Cuba and has asked the O.A.S. to adopt non-economic measures against Cuba after the government’s treatment of peaceful dissidents in 2003. Press Release, Canadian Network on Cuba, Canada. Cuba and the OAS, at http://www.canadiannetworkoncuba.ca/CanadaGov/OAS.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 See Jimmy Carter, The United States and Cuba: A Vision for the Twenty-First Century, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391 (2002); Mikhail Gorbachev, The Last Wall, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42248-2003Oct3?language=printer (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CUBA WORKING GROUP, A REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (2002), available at http://www.cubafoundation.org/CWG-Review.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004). For an analysis of votes for and against the embargo in the 108th Congress, see CUBA POLICY FOUND., CUBA AT THE START OF THE 108TH CONGRESS: EMBARGO OPPONENTS MAINTAIN WINNING MAJORITIES ON KEY ISSUES, SETTING UP CONTEST WITH LEADERSHIP, ADMINISTRATION (2003), available at http://www.cubafoundation.org/Releases/RELEASE%20%20Embargo%20Opponents'%20Upper%20Hand%20in%20108th%20Congress%20-%200301.13.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 See WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AM., HOUSE AND SENATE WORKING GROUPS, available at http://www.wola.org/cuba/house_senate_cuba_working_groups.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AM., 2003 HOUSE VOTES TO EASE EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA, available at http://www.wola.org/cuba/2003_house_vote_analysis_oct03.htm (last visited Oct. 6,2004) [hereinafter 2003 HOUSE VOTES]; Anita Snow, Senator Wants Cuban Dissidents Freed, CBSNEWS.COM, Apr. 24, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/18/ world/main550099.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); Letter from James A. Leach, U.S. Congressman, to Josh S. Startup, law student, University of Iowa College of Law (Oct. 29, 2003) (on file with TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.).
 The vote was on the “Flake Amendment,” which proposed to amend the Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies Appropriations bill. This constituted the fourth consecutive year that the House has voted to end the travel restrictions to Cuba. Two other amendments passed as well, one to end the restrictions on remittances to Cuba and the other to end educational travel restrictions. 2003 HOUSE VOTES, supra note 41.
 LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP, SENATE PASSES CUBA TRAVEL AMENDMENT, available at http://www.lawg.org/countries/Cuba/senate_vote_article.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); see LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP, SENATE VOTE TO END THE TRAVEL BAN: VOTE SUMMARY, available at http://www.lawg.org/countries/Cuba/senate-votes.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP, CONFERENCE COMMITTEE STRIPS TRAVEL AMENDMENT, available at http://www.lawg.org/countries/Cuba/conference-comm.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 PAR ROSSON, CUBA POLICY FOUND., ESTIMATED AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXPANDED U.S. TOURISM TO CUBA (2003), available at http://www.cubafoundation.org/CPF/%20Travel-Ag%20Study/CubaTourismExports%20 Study-Feb2003.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); see ED SANDERS & PATRICK LONG, CUBA POLICY FOUND., ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM LIFTING THE BAN ON TRAVEL TO CUBA (2002), available at http://www.cubafoundation.org/CPF%20Cuba%20Travel%20Study.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 PAR ROSSON & FLYNN ADCOCK, CTR. FOR N. AM. STUDIES, DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO CUBA (2001); see also JEREMY M. MATTSON & WON W. KOO, CTR. FOR AGRIC. POLICY AND TRADE STUDIES, AN OVERVIEW OF CUBAN AGRICULTURE AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES (2003).
 TOM RIAL, CTR. FOR AGRIC. AND RURAL DEV., CUBA: AN EMERGING MARKET FOR IOWA AGRICULTURE? (2003), at http://www.card.iastate.edu/iowa_ag_review/ winter_03/article2.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (estimating “that Iowa likely would gain more than $70 million inagricultural sales to Cuba, with an additional spin-off of more than $206 million into the Iowa economy”). See U.S.-CUBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL INC., ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA, at http://www.cuba.com/btm/20jan03.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 Anna Chaloupka, Trade with Cuba could open business floodgates, THE BATTALION, Feb. 8, 2002, available at http://www.thebatt.com/news/2002/02/08/FrontPage/ Trade.With.Cuba.Could.Open.Business.Floodgates-516943.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); ROSSON, supra note 45; U.S. Economic and Trade Policy Toward Cuba: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 106-73 (1998), available at http://www.cubatrade.org/cong98.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of John Kavulich II, President, U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.).
 John-Thor Dahlburg, Bush Brothers Keenly Attentive to Cuban Americans, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2002, available at http://www.rose-hulman.edu/~delacova/us-cuba/bush-attentive.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
 See Pamela Falk, Brother vs. Brother, CBSNEWS.COM, Aug. 8, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/08/opinion/main567288.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2004); Republicans, the 2004 Election, and the Cuban American Vote, Aug. 14, 2003, available at http://www.thecarpetbaggerreport.com/ archives/000520.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).